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ARTICLE 
THE FOLLY OF REQUIRING COMPLETE KNOWLEDGE OF 
THE CRIMINAL LAW  
Paul J. Larkin, Jr.†  
Some criminal law axioms represent moral judgments. A classic example 
is William Blackstone’s adage that “it is better that ten guilty persons escape, 
than that one innocent suffer.”1 That proposition does not represent an 
empirically proven conclusion. Blackstone did not make that claim, no one 
has proved it since then, the variables are too numerous for any attempt to 
be successful, and there are too many counterexamples for any proof to be 
persuasive. (What if among the ten guilty persons are Ted Bundy, Jeffrey 
Dahmer, John Wayne Gacy, Timothy McVeigh, and Usama bin Laden?) 
By contrast, at one time the principle that “Everyone is presumed to 
know the law,” which is more a rule of law than a presumption,2 did 
represent the actual state of affairs. There were a limited number of crimes 
at common law, and they were obvious to everyone given their violent 
nature (murder, rape, and robbery) or religious underpinnings 
(blasphemy).3 The colonies brought the common law of crimes to American 
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Foundation; M.P.P., George Washington University, 2012; J.D., Stanford Law School, 1980; 
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 1. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358; see Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 
432, 456 (1895) (embracing Blackstone’s maxim). 
 2. See Michael H. v. Gerald D. 491 U.S. 110, 119-21 (1989) (plurality opinion) 
(explaining that an irrebutable presumption is properly treated as a rule of law); 5 JOHN 
HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT 
COMMON LAW 453-54 (2d ed. 1923). 
 3. There were only eight original common law felonies: treason, murder, 
manslaughter, rape, robbery, sodomy, burglary, larceny, and arson. Paul J. Larkin, Jr., 
Mistakes and Justice—Using the Pardon Power to Remedy a Mistake of Law, 15 GEO. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 651, 666 n.76 (2017); see THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE 
COMMON LAW 442-62 (5th ed. 1956) (discussing the origin and development of the common 
law crimes). The common law courts added new ones over time. See, e.g., JEROME HALL, 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 53 (2d ed. 1960); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 
78-80 (5th ed. 2010); Francis Bowes Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 68-
69 (1933); see generally 1-3 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF 
ENGLAND (1883).  
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soil,4 and the first federal criminal statute contained approximately thirty 
offenses.5 Everyone would have known where to find the line between legal 
and illegal conduct. 
Today, however, it makes sense to treat that presumption of knowledge 
only as a rebuttable presumption—that is, the starting point for an inquiry 
into what someone knew or could be expected to know. The reason is that 
the small codes of yesteryear have gone the way of buggy whips and slide 
rules. Today, there are thousands of federal and state criminal offenses 
spread over the fifty-one titles and 27,000 pages of the U.S. Code and the 
fifty parallel versions in the states.6 Aside from addressing new ways that 
man has discovered to make life unpleasant for his neighbor (kidnapping, 
drug trafficking, and so forth), Congress and the state legislatures decided 
to use the criminal law to enforce numerous rules made necessary by the 
transformation of America from the rural, agricultural society lauded by 
Thomas Jefferson7 into the urban, industrialized society faced by President 
Benjamin Harrison and his successors.8 The result is that, in some unknown 
number of cases, the aphorism “Everyone is presumed to know the law” 
should be rewritten as “Everyone is presumed to know some of the law.” So 
                                                                                                                                      
 4. See Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2133 (2015) (plurality opinion) (“Edward Coke[’s] 
. . . Institutes ‘were read in the American Colonies by virtually every student of law . . . .”’) 
(citation omitted); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 530 (1884) (noting that the 
“descendants of Englishmen . . . inherited the traditions of the English law and history . . . .”); 
Herbert Pope, The English Common Law in the United States, 24 HARV. L. REV. 6 (1910). 
Eleven colonies enacted “receiving statutes,” which incorporated the common law as state 
law. New Jersey adopted the common law through its state constitution; Connecticut, by 
judicial decision. English common law remained colonial law until replaced by an act of the 
colonial legislature. See, e.g., MORTON HOROWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 
1780-1860, at 8 (1977); WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: 
IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760-1830, at 18-20 (1975)). 
 5. See An Act for the Punishment of certain Crimes against the United States, 1 STAT. 
112 (1790). The act made it a crime to interfere with functions of the new government, such 
as treason, misprision of treason, perjury in federal court, bribery of federal judges, and 
forgery of federal certificates or securities. It also outlawed common law crimes with a 
connection to federal property or particular federal interests, such as murder, robbery, 
larceny, and receipt of stolen property on federal land or on the high seas. 
 6. See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Public Choice Theory & Overcriminalization, 36 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 715, 726-27 (2013) (hereafter Larkin, Public Choice); Ellen S. Podgor, 
Overcriminalization: The Politics of Crime, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 541 (2005). 
 7. See THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA (Penguin Classics 1998) 
(1st ed. 1781). 
 8. See THOMAS C. MCCRAW, AMERICAN BUSINESS SINCE 1920: HOW IT WORKED (3d ed. 
2018); GLENN PORTER, THE RISE OF BIG BUSINESS, 1860-1920 (2006). 
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revised, the maxim becomes a more humble rebuttable presumption than 
an audacious across-the-board rule.  
It is the burden of this Article to persuade the reader of that proposition. 
The argument below proceeds in five steps. Part I argues that elementary 
principles of criminal and constitutional law require the government to 
identify the line between lawful and unlawful conduct. Part II explains that 
the standard for deciding whether the population has been adequately 
informed is whether a “person of ordinary intelligence” or the “average 
person” would know what the law forbids. Part III shifts from normative 
and legal to empirical and practical considerations. It maintains that there is 
too much criminal law for the average person to know its entirety, 
particularly when you move beyond physically harmful, dangerous, and 
immoral conduct—conduct that the common law deemed malum in se or 
inherently evil—to crimes that exist only because a legislature or regulatory 
agency decided to invoke the criminal law as an enforcement tool—conduct 
known as malum prohibitum or conduct that is a crime only because the 
democratic process has so labeled it. Part IV then takes the position that it is 
a mistake to assume that the person of ordinary intelligence can acquire 
complete knowledge of the criminal law by informally learning community 
social mores. Part V suggests how we can remedy this problem. This Article 
then concludes by asking for honesty from courts confronted by a 
defendant’s legitimate claim that no reasonable person would have known 
that what was charged against him is a crime. 
I. THE FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENT OF ANY CRIMINAL CODE:  
IT MUST BE UNDERSTANDABLE  
It is not often that we need to identify the fundamental principles 
underlying the criminal law. Only a political revolutionary, a member of the 
American Law Institute, or a law professor (or perhaps all three) could 
propose that we ditch the entire corpus of federal and state criminal law 
that has developed over the last millennium and adopt an entirely new 
criminal code. Legislators, judges, and scholars ordinarily content 
themselves with merely making revisions around the edges in order to 
improve the criminal law in the same type of slow and steady manner that 
enabled the tortoise to beat the hare. Of course, every now and then some 
people have the chance to wipe the slate clean and start anew. The first state 
officials elected after the Declaration of Independence was signed, the 
Framers of our Constitution, and the members of the First Congress were in 
that position long ago. Yet, even they generally left in place the common law 
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of crimes that they brought with them from England, at least how it stood 
in 1776.9  
Nonetheless, every now and then a criminal code becomes so 
voluminous and encrusted with barnacles from years of revisions and 
additions that scholars, judges, and legislators decide to start over rather 
than revise the existing code. The American Law Institute took up that 
project in the 1950s and published its Model Penal Code fifty-six years ago 
in an effort to organize and modernize criminal law.10 Although that 
attempt failed to generate the critical mass necessary to become legislation 
nationwide, some members of Congress have recently taken up the chore of 
devising a new federal criminal code. Representative James Sensenbrenner, 
for example, has called the federal criminal code “a mess”11 and sponsored 
legislation that would have replaced federal penal law, Title 18 of the U.S. 
Code. Former senior Department of Justice officials, the American Bar 
Association, and various scholars have urged Congress and the states to 
reform the criminal law.12 Perhaps, that rough beast’s hour has come round 
at last.13 
Suppose that Congress and the Council of State Governments decided to 
commission someone to prepare a Model Penal Code 2.0 and selected a 
reporter for that task. Let’s call her Doris, after the wife of Herbert 
                                                                                                                                      
 9. See Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2133 (2015) (plurality opinion); Hurtado v. 
California, 110 U.S. 516, 530 (1884). 
 10. MODEL PENAL CODE (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962); see Herbert 
Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1097 (1952). 
 11. See Criminal Code Reform: Hearing Before the Over-Criminalization Task Force of 
2014 on the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 1-3 (2014) (Prepared Statement of Rep. 
F. James Sensenbrenner, Over-Criminalization Task Force) (“The federal Criminal Code is a 
mess. Rather than a well-organized, systemic tool for enforcing important Federal criminal 
statutes, the Code is riddled with provisions that are outdated, redundant, or simply 
inconsistent with more recent modifications to reflect today’s modern approach to criminal 
law. This is due, at least in part, to Congress’s penchant for legislating in a vacuum, in a 
politically popular manner, or in rapid response to a crisis or national news story, instead of 
thoughtfully and deliberately. The resulting Code is a vast, chaotic, disorganized 
amalgamation of criminal statutes that is difficult to use for practitioners and nearly 
incomprehensible to the average American. The size and disorganization makes it 
extraordinarily difficult to ferret out the law applicable to a particular factual situation, which 
does a great disservice to the public.”).  
 12. See Larkin, Public Choice, supra note 6, at 720–21 & nn.16–20 (collecting 
authorities). 
 13. See W.B. YEATS, The Second Coming (1919), in 1 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF W.B. 
YEATS: THE POEMS 189, 190 (Richard J. Finneran ed., 1997) (“And what rough beast, its hour 
come round at last / Slouches towards Bethlehem to be born?”). 
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Wechsler, the chief reporter on the ALI’s 1962 effort.14 The content of what 
she ultimately would have prepared doubtless would be the subject of an 
interesting debate. For purposes of this Article, however, what is most 
important is how she would have begun her task. Before deciding what to 
specifically outlaw, Doris likely would start by identifying what, if any, 
principles should serve as the foundation for her code. It is likely that Doris 
would have started with two elementary principles.  
The first one would be that there must be a law that a person can be said 
to have violated. That principle is called the “Rule of Legality,” but also is 
known by the Latin phrases “[N]ullum crimen sine lege” (“There is no crime 
absent a written law”) and “[N]ulla poena sine lege” (“There is no penalty 
absent a written law”).15 Perhaps an axiom of the criminal law in every 
Western nation, the Rule of Legality has been described as one of the most 
“widely held value-judgment[s] in the entire history of human thought.”16 
That rule reflects the principle that, for a criminal justice system to be 
deemed just, a person must be able to avoid committing an act that renders 
him liable for criminal punishment.17 Otherwise, the criminal law could 
become a weapon of oppression rather than a means of promoting social 
order and would fall somewhere along the spectrum between the fictional 
system that Shirley Jackson created in The Lottery18 and the real-life systems 
that some of history’s despots actually applied.19 No one would characterize 
any such system as just. Accordingly, to Professor George Fletcher, “We 
start with the assumption that a just conviction presupposes that the actor 
                                                                                                                                      
 14. Tamar Lewin, Herbert Wechsler, Legal Giant, Is Dead at 90, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 
2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/04/28/us/herbert-wechsler-legal-giant-is-dead-at-
90.html.  
 15. Jerome Hall, Nulla Poena Sine Lege, 47 YALE L.J. 165, 165 (1937). Closely related to 
the Rule of Legality are the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 
9, cl. 3; § 10, cl. 1. The Framers recognized that the Rule of Legality is fundamental by 
prohibiting the federal and state governments from applying a new criminal law 
retroactively.  
 16. JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 59 (2d ed. 1960). 
 17. See, e.g., Hall, supra note 15, at 165, 178; Edwin Meese III & Paul J. Larkin, Jr., 
Reconsidering the Mistake of Law Defense, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 725, 726 (2012). 
 18. See Shirley Jackson, The Lottery, THE NEW YORKER (June 26, 1948), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/1948/06/26/the-lottery.  
 19. See, e.g., THOMAS PITT TASWELL-LANGMEAD, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 67 
(2012) (“In disposition and character John was an oriental despot, a tyrant of the worst sort . 
. . . He was guilty of acts of cruelty rivaling those of Nero.”) (footnote omitted). 
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had a fair chance of avoiding his act of wrongdoing or his violation of a 
statute.”20 
The second principle follows from the first one: the criminal law must be 
understandable.21 The reason is simple: having a criminal law that no one 
can understand is tantamount to having no law at all.22 Several ancillary 
propositions follow from that one. For example, a criminal law must be 
publicly available so that people can read it. Legislatures cannot lock it away 
or put it in an inaccessible location.23 In fact, Article I of the Constitution 
requires Congress to publish all federal criminal laws,24 and the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause imposes the same obligation on the 
                                                                                                                                      
 20. GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 731 (1978); see also HERBERT PACKER, 
THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 68 (1968) (“People ought in general to be able to plan 
their conduct with some assurance that they can avoid entanglement with the criminal law; 
by the same token the enforcers and appliers of the law should not waste their time lurking 
in the bushes ready to trap the offender who is unaware that he is offending. It is precisely 
the fact that in its normal and characteristic operation the criminal law provides this 
opportunity and this protection to people in their everyday lives that makes it a tolerable 
institution in a free society. Take this away, and the criminal law ceases to be a guide to the 
well-intentioned and a restriction on the restraining power of the state.”); cf. H.L.A. HART, 
PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 28-53 (2d ed. 2008) (offering that rationale as the 
justification for recognizing excuses to crimes). 
 21. See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., The Dynamic Incorporation of Foreign Law and the 
Constitutional Regulation of Federal Lawmaking, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 337, 381-86 
(2015) (hereafter Larkin, Dynamic Incorporation).  
 22. Cf. Erwin Griswold, Government in Ignorance of the Law—A Plea for Better 
Publication of Executive Legislation, 48 HARV. L. REV. 198, 204 (1934) (lamenting the 
difficulty in finding an agency rule before the Federal Register Act of 1935, 44 U.S.C. § 1501 
(2012), required their publication). 
 23. See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 96 (1945) (plurality opinion) (“To enforce 
such a [vague] statute would be like sanctioning the practice of Caligula who ‘published the 
law, but it was written in a very small hand, and posted up in a corner, so that no one could 
make a copy of it.'”); 5 JEREMY BENTHAM, WORKS 547 (1843) (“We hear of tyrants, and those 
cruel ones: but, whatever we may have felt, we have never heard of any tyrant in such sort 
cruel, as to punish men for disobedience to laws or orders which he had kept them from the 
knowledge of.”); 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *46 (noting that Caligula “wrote his laws in 
a very small character, and hung them up upon high pillars, the more effectually to ensnare 
the people.”); Livingston Hall & Selig J. Seligman, Mistake of Law and Mens Rea, 8 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 641, 650 n.39 (1941) (“[W]here the law was not available to the community, the 
principle of ‘nulla poena sine lege’ comes into play . . . .”).   
 24. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3 (“Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, 
and from time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment 
require Secrecy . . . .”). 
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states.25 Moreover, published criminal laws must be written in English, the 
mother tongue in this nation.26 That leaves out Latin, Hausa, Pashtu, 
Sinhalese, Tagalog, or Urdu, even French or Spanish, as well as Morse code, 
semaphore, smoke signals, or a computer code series of 0s and 1s. 
Jabberwocky also doesn’t cut it.27  
Of course, even an accessible criminal law written in English is 
inadequate if its terms are so vague that no one can readily understand what 
they mean. There is even a well-settled criminal and constitutional law 
doctrine establishing that principle, known as the “Void-for-Vagueness” 
Doctrine.28 According to that doctrine, a criminal law must fairly tell the 
public exactly what is a crime, and a statute so vague that a person can only 
guess as to its meaning cannot be used as a criminal law.29 At bottom, the 
principle is that vague laws are little better than having no law at all.30 As the 
                                                                                                                                      
 25. See Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 457 (2001) (quoting Bouie v. City of 
Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 350 (1964)) (reiterating “the ‘basic principle that a criminal statute 
must give fair warning of the conduct that it makes a crime’”); id. at 459 (reiterating the 
“core due process concepts of notice, foreseeability, and, in particular, the right to fair 
warning as those concepts bear on the constitutionality of attaching criminal penalties to 
what previously had been innocent conduct”). 
 26. Larkin, Dynamic Incorporation, supra note 21, at 387-88. 
 27. Id.; Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 871 (1930) (“A 
statute made in Latin at the present time is no statute, although the intention of the 
legislature can be as well or as ill made out from Latin as from English.”). 
 28. See generally Anthony G. Amsterdam, Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the 
Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67 (1960) (discussing the historical development of the 
void-for-vagueness doctrine); Meese & Larkin, supra note 17, at 761; Paul J. Larkin, Jr., The 
Lost Due Process Doctrines, 66 CATH. U.L. REV. 293, 307–08 (2016) (hereafter Larkin, Lost 
Due Process Doctrines).  
 29. See, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 253 (2012) (“A 
fundamental principle in our legal system is that laws which regulate persons or entities must 
give fair notice of conduct that is forbidden or required.”).  
 30. Vague criminal laws are problematic for several reasons. See Grayned v. City of 
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) (“First, because we assume that man is free to steer 
between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary 
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act 
accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. Second, if 
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit 
standards for those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy 
matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, 
with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application. Third, but related, 
where a vague statute ‘abut(s) upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms,’ it 
‘operates to inhibit the exercise of (those) freedoms.’ Uncertain meanings inevitably lead 
citizens to ‘steer far wider of the unlawful zone . . . than if the boundaries of the forbidden 
areas were clearly marked.’”).  
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Supreme Court explained in Lanzetta v. New Jersey, “No one may be 
required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of 
penal statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to what the State 
commands or forbids.”31 That is why no legislature can make it a crime to 
do “bad things” and leave it to courts to flesh out that term on a case-by-
case basis.32  
II. THE STANDARD FOR MEASURING UNDERSTANDABILITY: 
WHAT A “PERSON OF ORDINARY INTELLIGENCE” WOULD UNDERSTAND 
Once Doris realized that the criminal code must be understandable, she 
would have turned to the question of what standard she should use to 
analyze a statute. The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine, she would have 
realized, identifies the standard that a court must use when deciding 
whether a criminal law is sufficiently clear. The issue in every vagueness 
case is how an average person would understand a statute. As the Court 
explained in an early application of this doctrine, “a statute which either 
forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of 
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to 
its application violates the first essential of due process of law.”33 Put 
differently (and in a gender neutral fashion), “[t]he constitutional 
requirement of definiteness is violated by a criminal statute that fails to give 
a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his [or her] contemplated 
conduct is forbidden by the statute.”34 A “person of ordinary intelligence,” a 
“person of common intelligence,” “the common world”—those are the 
phrases that the Supreme Court has used to describe how to decide whether 
a statute is understandable. The Court has used that standard when it has 
upheld criminal laws over vagueness challenges and when it has held them 
unconstitutional.35  
                                                                                                                                      
 31. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939). 
 32. See, e.g., Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971) (holding unconstitutionally vague 
a local ordinance making it unlawful to act “in a manner annoying to” passersby). 
 33. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (emphasis added). 
 34. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954) (emphasis added; footnote 
omitted). 
 35. For cases rejecting void-for-vagueness challenges to legislation, see, e.g., Chapman v. 
United States, 500 U.S. 453, 456 (1991) (“mixture or substance containing a detectable 
amount” of a controlled substance); United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 90 (1975) (“other 
firearms capable of being concealed on the person”); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 
547 (1975) (“Indian country”); Roth v. United States, 354, 479–80 U.S. 476 (1957) 
(“obscenity”); United States v. Korpan, 354 U.S. 271, 274 (1957) (“so-called ‘slot’ machine”); 
United States v. Spector, 343 U.S. 169, 593 (1952) (“timely application in good faith” for 
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departure documents from United States); United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 614 (1954) 
(“receiving any contributions or expending any money” to influence the passage or defeat of 
federal legislation); Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 339 (1952) (“so 
far as practicable”); Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 224 (1951) (“crime involving moral 
turpitude”); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 496 (1951) (advocating the “propriety of 
overthrowing or destroying any government in the United States by force or violence”); Cole 
v. Arkansas, 338 U.S. 345, 348 (1949) (a person acting in concert with others “to assemble at 
or near any place where a ‘labor dispute’ exists”); United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 3 
(1947) (“in excess of the number of employees needed”); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 
93 (1945) (“rights, privileges, or immunities . . . protected by the Constitution and laws of the 
United States”); United States v. Ragen, 314 U.S. 513, 517 (1942) (“reasonable allowance”); 
Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19, 21 (1941) (“connected with the national defense”); 
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 109 n.1 (1941) (“industries engaged in commerce or in 
the production of goods for commerce”); Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 
U.S. 270, 271, 273 (1940) (“psychopathic personality” as shown by “habitual course of 
misconduct in sexual matters” demonstrating “an utter lack of power to control their sexual 
impulses'” and a likelihood “to attack or otherwise inflict injury, loss, pain or other evil on 
the objects of their uncontrolled and uncontrollable desire”); Kay v. United States, 303 U.S. 1 
(1938) (permitting only “ordinary charges authorized and required by the Corporation for 
services actually rendered for examination and perfecting of title, appraisal, and like 
necessary services”); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 255 (1937) (“at any time”); Old 
Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183, 185 (1936) (“fair and open 
competition”); Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 381 (1932) (“shortest practicable route”); 
United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396, 398 (1930) (to solicit or receive “any . . . 
contribution for any political purpose whatever”); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 359 
(1927) (“criminal syndicalism”); Burns v. United States, 274 U.S. 328, 330 (1927) (same 
phrase “criminal syndicalism”); United States v. Alford, 274 U.S. 264, 266 (1927) (“[w]hoever 
shall build a fire in or near any forest, timber, or other inflammable material upon the public 
domain”); Miller v. Oregon, 273 U.S. 657 (1927) aff’g 119 Or. 409 (1926) (involuntary 
manslaughter conviction for doing a lawful act “without due caution or circumspection”); 
Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242, 249 (1922) (“unjust and unreasonable” or 
“oppressive” rent); Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343, 345 n.4 (1918) (grazing sheep on 
any cattle range “usually occupied by any cattle grower”); Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273, 
275 (1915) (any written matter “having a tendency to encourage or incite the commission of 
any crime, breach of the peace, or act of violence, or which shall tend to encourage or 
advocate disrespect for law”); Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1913) (antitrust rule of 
reason). 
  For cases holding statutes unconstitutionally vague, see, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television 
Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239 (2012) (“indecent” broadcast); Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 
45 (1999) (“criminal street gang”); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983); Colautti v. 
Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979); Smith v. Gogen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974); Papachristou v. 
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) (“vagrant”); Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971) 
(“annoying” public passersby); Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87 (1965) 
(“loitering”); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952) (“sacrilegious”); Winters v. 
New York, 333 U.S. 507, 513 (1948) (“so massed as to become vehicles for inciting”); 
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (“loiter”); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 452 
(1939) (“[a]ny person not engaged in any lawful occupation, known to be a member of a 
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Who is the typical “person of ordinary intelligence”? Like the “reasonable 
person” used in tort law when defining negligence, a “person of ordinary 
intelligence” is a legal construct, an ideal, not a particular individual. The 
Supreme Court has not defined the criteria that a court must use to identify 
that individual for vagueness purposes, but we can safely assume that, for 
the construct to make sense, it must correspond to reality. Just as someone 
need not be an Olympic athlete to be physically fit, a person need not be a 
Nobel laureate to possess “ordinary intelligence.” That would set the bar so 
high that the extraordinary would become the ordinary. Language does not 
equate the two, so neither should the law.  
If that is true, actual population demographics matter. Here, then, are the 
facts: According to the U.S. Census Bureau, in 2015 nearly ninety percent of 
adults had at least a high school diploma or a Graduate Equivalency Degree 
(GED).36 Roughly fifty-nine percent had completed at least some amount of 
college without receiving a degree.37 Only forty-two percent, however, 
received an associate’s degree, only thirty-three percent received a 
bachelor’s degree, and only twelve percent received an advanced degree of 
some type.38  
Those facts make clear that the “person of ordinary intelligence” is not a 
lawyer, a judge, or a law professor. Nor is he someone with legal, technical, 
scientific, or any other type of advanced education and training in fields 
such as medicine, biochemistry, geology, hydrology, and so forth. The 
Census Bureau’s data makes it clear that the standard is what an average 
high school graduate would know to be the law. Requiring anything more 
would have the practical effect of requiring a person to obtain legal or 
scientific education or advice to know what the law forbids. The common 
law certainly imposed no such duty. Indeed, any such obligation would 
have been entirely senseless at a time when there were few people who 
could read and write, even fewer lawyers, and no law schools. That state of 
                                                                                                                                      
gang”); Bandini Petroleum Co. v. Superior Court, 284 U.S. 8, 10 (1931) (“unreasonable 
waste”); Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553 (1931) (“auto transportation company” as applied to 
a non-common carrier); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 361 (1931) (displaying any 
“symbol or emblem of opposition to organized government”); Cline v. Frank Dairy Co., 274 
U.S. 445 (1927) (“unreasonable” profits); Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926) 
(“the current rate of per diem wages in the locality”); Weeds, Inc. v. United States, 255 U.S. 
109 (1921) (charging “excessive prices for . . . necessaries”); United States v. L. Cohen 
Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921) (“any unjust or unreasonable rate or charge in handling . . . 
any necessaries”); Int’l Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216 (1914) (“real” price or value). 
 36. See CAMILLE L. RYAN & KURT BAUMAN, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COM., 
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: 2015, at 1-2 Tbl. 1 (Mar. 2016). 
 37. See id.  
 38. See id. 
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affairs, of course, is no longer true. The average person now has a high 
school diploma. But no legislature has required a person to consult an 
attorney or other expert to avoid becoming a criminal. On the contrary, 
courts have looked askance on claims that a person should be exculpated 
because he followed legal advice.39 
With the Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in mind, Doris would then have 
drafted the code. She would have included the common law crimes, 
supplemented by the blue-collar and white-collar crimes that assemblies 
and courts had added over the years. Before giving her draft to the 
legislatures, she would have stood back and looked at her draft code as a 
whole. That is when it would have struck her.  
The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine teaches that each individual law must 
be understandable, and it supplies the test for gauging the 
comprehensibility of a particular statute. Making sure that a person of 
ordinary intelligence could understand precisely what each statute outlaws, 
however, solves only part of the notice problem. The penal code demands 
that every person comply with every criminal statute, which means that 
everyone must know what the entire code prohibits. That raises the 
question whether there were too many statutes in Doris’s draft code for the 
average person to understand and remember. Doris would have realized 
that she had an entirely different problem, one that no legislature or court 
had ever considered.  
III. THE CRIMINAL LAW IS TOO VOLUMINOUS AND COMPLEX FOR A  
PERSON OF ORDINARY INTELLIGENCE TO KNOW IT ALL 
The problem was due to the enormous growth in the volume and 
complexity of the penal code. Consider the federal criminal code. What 
started in 1789 as a copse of roughly thirty trees had now become a jungle 
more than 100 times larger. There are thousands of criminal laws, many of 
them quite new, making the code one-third larger in 2004 than it had been 
in 1980.40 In fact, there are now so many federal offenses that no one—
neither the U.S. Department of Justice, the American Bar Association, nor 
the Congressional Research Service, each of which had actually tried to 
answer that question—knew what was the correct number.41 If they could 
                                                                                                                                      
 39. See, e.g., Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 299 (1929) (ruling that reliance on 
the advice of counsel is not a complete defense to a crime). 
 40. See Larkin, Public Choice, supra note 6, at 729. 
 41. See id. at 726. 
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not answer that question, Doris realized, the average high school graduate 
could not be expected to have the answer.  
That problem is only worsened, Doris would have realized, when she 
considered that agencies can promulgate regulations whose violation can be 
punished as a crime.42 People of “ordinary intelligence” do not read the 
Code of Federal Regulations (unless they have trouble falling asleep). Few 
have probably heard of the Federal Register, let alone know where to find it. 
As Justice Lewis Powell once noted, it “is totally unrealistic to assume that 
more than a fraction of the persons and entities affected by a regulation . . . 
would have knowledge of its promulgation or familiarity with or access to 
the Federal Register.”43 People are generally aware of what the criminal law 
prohibits insofar as it tracks the prevailing moral code. By the time of 
adolescence, everyone knows not to murder, rape, rob, or swindle someone 
else.44 (Anyone who claims that he was unaware that theft and murder are 
illegal is effectively raising an insanity defense and should be treated as if he 
had expressly done so.) Indeed, Anglo-American criminal law grew out of 
pre-Norman customs.45 But no society, including this one, catalogues its 
morals or mores in a Code of Federal Regulations, nor is there a 
longstanding American tradition of referring to any such document to learn 
those norms. If so, why is it reasonable to expect that people should be 
required, at risk of imprisonment if they fail, to know what rules are found 
in the CFR? 
                                                                                                                                      
 42. See United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911); Larkin, Public Choice, supra note 
6, at 728–29. 
 43. Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 290 (1978) (Powell, J., 
concurring).  
 44. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 
108-09 (1993) (“Perhaps the most primitive and basic rules in the criminal justice system 
were those that protected property rights . . . . The laws against theft, larceny, embezzlement, 
and fraud are familiar friends. People may not know every technical detail, but they get the 
general point. Probably all human communities punish theft in one way or another; it is hard 
to imagine a society that does not have a concept of thievery, and some way to punish people 
who help themselves to things that ‘belong’ to somebody else.”); OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, 
JR., THE COMMON LAW 125 (1881) (“[T]he fact that crimes are also generally sins is one of the 
practical justifications for requiring a man to know the criminal law.”); LAFAVE, supra note 3, 
at 14-15; JOHN SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 427 (8th ed. 1930); Hall & Seligman, supra note 23, 
at 644 (“[T]he early criminal law appears to have been well integrated with the mores of the 
time, out of which it arose as ‘custom.”’); Sayre, supra note 3, at 68–69; Mark D. Yochum, 
The Death of a Maxim: Ignorance of Law Is No Excuse (Killed by Money, Guns and a Little 
Sex), 13 ST. JOHN'S J. LEG. COM. 635, 636 (1999) (“[E]vil is fundamentally known . . . . 
Ignorance that murder is a crime is no excuse for the crime of murder.”).  
 45. See Larkin, Lost Due Process Doctrines, supra note 28, at 327-29. 
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What does that tell us? The above figures, of course, do not equate with 
intelligence or mental ability. Many people without formal education and 
degrees are more learned and savvier than some college faculty members, 
particularly with regard to understanding community norms. But those 
figures give us some help in deciding how much knowledge of the criminal 
law we can expect the average person to have. If you expect people to know 
what high school graduates know, you should succeed with nearly ninety 
percent of adults. That will not reach everyone, but ninety percent is a very 
large portion of the population, and it may be the most that anyone could 
expect. By contrast, if you expect the population to know what only 
someone with a college or advanced degree could understand, two-thirds of 
the population would fail. That is quite troublesome. No system of justice 
could call itself fair if two of every three people cannot avoid running afoul 
of the law. Indeed, it is possible that more than two thirds of the Roman 
public knew the criminal code during the time of the Roman Emperor 
Caligula even though he published the laws in a location that effectively 
made them unreadable.46  
We now have a very serious problem, Doris would have surmised.  
On the one hand, the Due Process Clause requires the government to 
inform someone in a particular case of the specific charges and penalties he 
faces when he is sued for a tort or charged with a crime.47 The rationale is 
that everyone has the right to defend himself against any claim or charge, 
and that right is meaningless if a trial can be held in his absence. On the 
other hand, the Supreme Court has never required a legislature to send a 
copy of every new criminal law to everyone in its jurisdiction, and for more 
than 200 years none of them did. Publication of a statute in the federal or a 
state penal code is the traditional means of notifying the public what is now 
a crime.48 But that is more a matter of necessity than anything else.49 No one 
                                                                                                                                      
 46. See supra note 23. 
 47. See, e.g., Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220 (2006); Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110, 120–
21 (1991) (ruling that the defendant must have adequate notice of his eligibility for the death 
penalty); Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444 (1982); Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust 
Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313–20 (1950); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948) (“A person's right to 
reasonable notice of a charge against him, and an opportunity to be heard in his defense—a 
right to his day in court—are basic in our system of jurisprudence . . . .”). 
 48. See John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal 
Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189, 207 (1985) (“Publication of a statute's text always suffices; the 
government need make no further effort to apprise the people of the content of the law.”).  
 49. See United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291, 309 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment, joined by Kennedy & Thomas, JJ.) (“It may well be true that 
in most cases the proposition that the words of the United States Code or the Statutes at 
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believes that the average person reads the Congressional Record, the 
Statutes at Large, or the Federal Register. The result is that a person can 
unwittingly engage in conduct that neither he nor any reasonable person 
would have known to be a crime. That is particularly true when the criminal 
law proposes to outlaw conduct that previously was not an offense.50 Yes, he 
will be notified when the government charges him with committing that 
offense, but his trial will largely be a formality. What a person needs to 
know is whether he is near the line of criminality. Proving that someone 
crossed a line that no one knew existed is uncomfortably similar to proving 
that he crossed a line that was drawn only after he had crossed it. Because 
“compliance presupposes knowledge,”51 the public must be aware of the 
metes and bounds of the criminal law; otherwise, there is a serious risk of 
oppression.  
How, then, can the very different notice rules mentioned above be 
reconciled?52 Claiming that there is a difference between the notice required 
in civil and criminal cases is unsatisfactory. Why should less notice be 
sufficient when the potential penalty is far greater? Relying on history is 
even less comforting. Have the federal and state governments regularly 
violated the Due Process Clause in criminal cases throughout the last two 
centuries plus? The implications of an affirmative answer to that question 
are disturbing. Even less satisfying is resort to the maxim that “Every man is 
presumed to know the law.” We indulge that fiction, at least insofar as the 
code reflects the Decalogue, because, as discussed below, it makes sense to 
that limited extent, but principally due to the limits of practicality. There is 
                                                                                                                                      
Large give adequate notice to the citizen is something of a fiction . . . albeit one required in 
any system of law . . . .”).  
 50. See, e.g., Rogers, 532 U.S. at 459 (quoted supra note 25); Connally, 269 U.S. at 391 
(“That the terms of a penal statute creating a new offense must be sufficiently explicit to 
inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its 
penalties is a well-recognized requirement, consonant alike with ordinary notions of fair play 
and the settled rules of law . . . .”).  
 51. Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 
400 (1994). 
 52. See Jeffries, supra note 48, at 207 (“In the context of civil litigation, where notice is 
taken seriously, publication is a last resort; more effective means must be employed wherever 
possible. It may be objected that no more effective means is possible where the intended 
recipient of the information is the entire populace or some broad segment thereof, rather 
than an identifiable individual or entity. But this argument at most explains why publication 
should sometimes suffice; it does not explain why no further obligation is ever considered. 
Nor does it explain why publication in some official document, no matter how inaccessible, 
is all that is required.”) (footnotes omitted). 
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little else that we can do.53 But “necessary fiction descends to needless 
farce,” to quote Justice Antonin Scalia, when that proposition is pushed too 
far.54 
Historically, the criminal law has built a critical safeguard to prevent the 
conviction of people who are not morally blameworthy: the requirement 
that the government prove that a person committed an unlawful act with a 
“guilty mind” or an “evil intent.” Anglo-American common law 
traditionally has required both elements for conduct to be a crime. “Actus 
non facit reum nisi mens sit rea”55—a crime consists of “a vicious will” and 
“an unlawful act consequent upon such vicious will.”56 Unfortunately, 
criminal laws today generally do not require the government to prove that 
the defendant knew he committed a crime. One way to require that proof is 
for the legislature to force the prosecution to prove that someone acted 
“willfully”—that is, he voluntarily and intentionally violated a known legal 
duty.57 But that is a rarity in federal and state criminal law. 
To make matters worse, in some instances legislatures have consciously 
adopted strict liability statutes, laws that impose liability simply for doing 
an act regardless of the actor’s state of mind.58 In other cases, legislatures, 
                                                                                                                                      
 53. See R.L.C., 503 U.S. at 309 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (“It may well be true that in most cases the proposition that the words of the 
United States Code or the Statutes at Large give adequate notice to the citizen is something 
of a fiction, . . . albeit one required in any system of law”) (citation omitted). 
 54. See id. (“[N]ecessary fiction descends to needless farce when the public is charged 
even with knowledge of Committee Reports.”). 
 55. Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 974 (1932). In English, the 
maxim means that an act does not make one guilty unless the mind is guilty. 
 56. See, e.g. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *21; see also, e.g., Roscoe Pound, 
Introduction to FRANCIS BOWES SAYRE, A SELECTION OF CASES ON CRIMINAL LAW 8–9 (1927) 
(“Historically, our substantive criminal law is based upon a theory of punishing the vicious 
will. It postulates a free agent confronted with a choice between doing right and doing wrong 
and choosing freely to do wrong.”).  
 57. The Supreme Court has consistently read the term “willful” to have that meaning. 
See, e.g., Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 192 (1998); Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 
135, 137 (1994); Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 200 (1991); United States v. 
Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10, 12 (1976); United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 360 (1973); see also 
United States v. Lizarraga-Lizarraga, 541 F.2d 826, 828-29 (9th Cir. 1976) (adopting the same 
interpretation for the export control laws). 
 58. See, e.g., Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Strict Liability Offenses, Incarceration, and the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause, 37 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1065, 1075-76 (2014) (hereafter 
Larkin, Strict Liability); Gerard E. Lynch, The Role of Criminal Law in Policing Corporate 
Misconduct, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 23, 38-39 (1997) (“[T]he more dominant and 
longer-standing trend in our century has been the erosion of mens rea requirements. This 
period has seen the dramatic growth of strict liability offenses (and their close cousin, 
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whether due to forgetfulness, sloppiness, or otherwise, have failed to ensure 
that a statute requires proof of a guilty mind as to an important element of 
an offense.59 Either failing is troublesome. Numerous giants in the criminal 
law—H.L.A. Hart, Lon Fuller, Herbert Packer, and the American Law 
Institute, among others—have consistently denounced strict criminal liability 
on a variety of grounds.60 As Herbert Wechsler once noted, “The most that 
can be said for such provisions is that where the penalty is light, where 
knowledge normally obtains and where a major burden of litigation is 
envisioned, there may be some practical basis for a stark limitation of the 
issues.”61 In those instances, “large injustice can seldom be done.”62 Yet, as 
he added, “[i]f these considerations are persuasive,” strict liability should 
never be an option “where any major sanction is involved.”63 As long as the 
                                                                                                                                      
liability for negligence) in American criminal law, and such offenses have found a particular 
home in the kind of regulatory criminal statutes that have the greatest impact in corporate 
settings.”). 
 59. See, e.g., McFadden v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2298 (2015). 
 60. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05, cmt. 1 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1955); LARRY 
ALEXANDER & KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY: A THEORY OF CRIMINAL 
LAW 71 (2009) (“We are not morally culpable for taking risks of which we are unaware.”); 
ALAN BRUDNER, PUNISHMENT AND FREEDOM: A LIBERAL THEORY OF PENAL JUSTICE 178–84 
(2009); LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 77 (1969) (“Strict criminal liability has never 
achieved respectability in our law.”); H.L.A. Hart, Negligence, Mens Rea, and Criminal 
Responsibility, in H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY 
OF LAW 152 (2008) (“[S]trict liability is odious.”); PACKER, supra note 20, at 130–31; Francis 
A. Allen, The Morality of Means: Three Problems in Criminal Sanctions, 42 U. PITT. L. REV. 
737, 742–48 (1981); Gary V. Dubin, Mens Rea Reconsidered: A Plea for a Due Process 
Concept of Criminal Responsibility, 18 STAN. L. REV. 322 (1966); Joel Feinberg, The Expressive 
Function of Punishment, in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT 25 (Gertrude 
Ezorsky ed., 2015); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 401, 422-25 (1958); Graham Hughes, Criminal Omissions, 67 YALE L.J. 590, 602-03 
(1958); Sanford H. Kadish, Excusing Crime, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 257, 267–68 (1987); Rollin M. 
Perkins, Criminal Liability Without Fault: A Disquieting Trend, 68 IOWA L. REV. 1067, 1067–
70 (1983); Paul Roberts, Strict Liability and the Presumption of Innocence: An Expose of 
Functionalist Assumptions, in APPRAISING STRICT LIABILITY 182, 191 (A.P. Simester ed., 2005); 
Alan Saltzman, Strict Criminal Liability and the United States Constitution: Substantive 
Criminal Law Due Process, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 1571 (1978); Sayre, supra note 3, at 56; A.P. 
Simester, Is Strict Liability Always Wrong?, in APPRAISING STRICT LIABILITY, supra, at 21 
(Strict liability is wrong because it “leads to conviction of persons who are, morally speaking, 
innocent . . . .”); Richard G. Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea: III—The Rise and Fall of 
Strict Criminal Liability, 30 B.C. L. REV. 337 (1989); see generally Larkin, Strict Liability, 
supra note 58 at 1079 n.46. 
 61. Wechsler, supra note 10, at 1109. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
2018] THE FOLLY OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 351 
 
criminal law sought to imprison only those people who, as the saying goes, 
took the law into their own hands, the risk of oppression could be kept to a 
minimum. Today, however, that safeguard is less certain, making the notice 
problem more acute. 
Doris would have then turned back to the rationale why the criminal law 
must be written, clear, and understandable. She would have considered the 
rationale that the Supreme Court had offered why the criminal law must be 
clear. The law must afford the average person fair warning of what can get 
someone fined, imprisoned, or hung. Doris would have discovered that the 
Court had offered a similar rationale for the canon of statutory construction 
teaching that ambiguous criminal laws must be strictly construed. As Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes explained in McBoyle v. United States,64 the 
criminal law does not demand clarity on the ground that it assumes that the 
average person will read a criminal statute before acting. The likelihood of 
that happening is slim.65 It requires clarity so that, if someone were to do 
that, he would know where to find the line between lawful and unlawful 
conduct.66 For that reason, the criminal law must ensure that “a fair 
warning should be given to the world in language that the common world 
will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed,” 
and, “[t]o make the warning fair, so far as possible the line should be 
clear.”67 
Perhaps that rationale made sense in 1914, when the Supreme Court 
adopted the Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine, Doris would have surmised, or 
perhaps it made sense in 1931, when the Court decided McBoyle. But she 
knew that it made little sense in 2018. The reason is that the issue today is 
materially different from the one that the Court faced in those years. Today, 
the question is not whether the average person can identify a tree as a tree 
when he looks at it close up, but is whether he can know the number of 
trees in the forest when he is standing in the middle of thousands of them. 
                                                                                                                                      
 64. McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25 (1931). 
 65. I am reminded of an old joke told about W.C. Fields. A passerby saw him reading 
the Bible one day and, because Fields was not considered a religious man, the passerby asked 
him why he was reading it. “I’m looking for loopholes,” Fields replied. 
 66. “Although it is not likely that a criminal will carefully consider the text of the law 
before he murders or steals, it is reasonable that a fair warning should be given to the world 
in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a 
certain line is passed. To make the warning fair, so far as possible the line should be clear.” 
McBoyle, 283 U.S. at 27. 
 67. Id. 
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IV. SOCIAL NORMS ARE INADEQUATE TO TEACH A PERSON OF ORDINARY 
INTELLIGENCE THE FULL CONTENT OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 
Maybe informal social norms could make up the difference, Doris would 
have hoped. The criminal law began as a collection of local customs and 
mores,68 and there continues to be a consensus about certain basic 
offenses.69 Perhaps the basic precepts of contemporary social norms would 
be adequate to supply an ordinary person with the knowledge that he needs 
to stay on the right side of the law if he is so inclined. Aside from informally 
learning the basic principles represented by the penal code, Doris would 
have remembered, individuals learn a host of different community norms 
that are necessary for a civil society and that, when absent, are signs of 
social disorder, such as the accumulation of garbage, public drinking and 
urination, panhandling, prostitution, the congregation of teenagers, graffiti, 
abandoned buildings and property, and so forth.70 At least, she thought, the 
issue was worth considering. To see what she could learn about the 
development of social norms, Doris would have sought to learn about the 
relationship between morals and the law from traditional legal sources71 and 
                                                                                                                                      
 68. See supra text accompanying note 45. 
 69. See WESLEY G. SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE: CRIME AND THE SPIRAL OF DECAY IN 
AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS 5 (1990) (“In the case of common crime, a large body of 
research indicates that there is in fact a value consensus. People of all races and classes agree 
we should shun theft, violence, sexual assault, and aggression against children. They give 
very similar ratings to the seriousness of various kinds of offenses, and they agree to a 
surprising extent on how stiff the punishments ought to be for violations of the law. The 
issue of what is criminal has been settled politically in debate over the criminal code, and 
within law-abiding society there is broad consensus on such matters. These middle-class 
values are just about everyone’s values.”); supra note 44. In theory, recent immigrants may be 
unaware of those norms, and studies apparently go both ways on the issue. See RUTH D. 
PETERSON & LAUREN J. KRIVO, DIVERGENT SOCIAL WORLDS: NEIGHBORHOOD CRIME AND THE 
RACIAL-SPATIAL DIVIDE 36 (2010). Some have argued that a defendant should escape 
criminal liability if he reasonably believed that foreign law or custom justified his actions. See 
Note, The Cultural Defense in the Criminal Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1293 (1986) (proposing a 
defense based on foreign cultural acceptability). That argument, to put it kindly, is absurd. 
Perhaps, the rape of women is culturally acceptable in some parts of the world, but not in 
this country. Nor would warfare between Boston and Philadelphia fans be acceptable 
because the Eagles beat the Patriots in the Super Bowl. Endorsing any such defense would 
invite disregard of the law, discrimination, and chaos. It is for precisely those reasons that 
the courts have uniformly rejected a plea for a right to jury nullification. See Paul J. Larkin, 
Jr., A Mistake of Law Defense as a Remedy for Overcriminalization, 28 A.B.A. J. CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE 10, 15 (Spring 2013).  
 70. See SKOGAN, supra note 69, at 1-5. 
 71. See, e.g., JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION (1989); ROBERT C. 
ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991); ERIC A. POSNER, 
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from scholars in the fields of cognitive, developmental, evolutionary, and 
social psychology.72 
According to the theory proposed by Professor Michael Tomasello, 
norms arose during the two stages of human evolution and societal 
development. The first stage occurred hundreds of thousands of years ago 
as humans evolved from primates. Over time, proto-humans came to 
realize that cooperation was a necessary strategy for survival because 
multiple hunters (“We”) were more successful than one (“I”).73 The result 
was an awareness of the benefits of cooperative behavior, the recognition of 
a sense of group purpose, and the development of the “We” versus “They” 
                                                                                                                                      
LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2002); Harold G. Grasmick & Donald E. Green, Legal Punishment, 
Social Disapproval and Internalization as Inhibitors of Illegal Behavior, 71 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 325 (1980); William K. Jones, A Theory of Social Norms, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 
545 (1994); Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 
349 (1997); Jody S. Kraus, Legal Design and the Evolution of Commercial Norms, 26 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 377 (1997); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 
(1995); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. 
L. REV. 338 (1997); Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and 
Nonlegal Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 133 (1996); Eric A. Posner, Law, 
Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697 (1996); Eric Rasmusen, Stigma and 
Self-Fulfilling Expectations of Criminality, 39 J.L. & ECON. 519 (1996); Paul H. Robinson & 
John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, Social 
Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996).  
 72. See, e.g., ELLIOTT ARONSON, THE SOCIAL ANIMAL (9th ed. 2004); GEOFFREY BRENNAN 
ET AL., EXPLAINING NORMS (2013); ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (Rev. 
ed. 2006); CRISTINA BICCHIERI, NORMS IN THE WILD: HOW TO DIAGNOSE, MEASURE, AND 
CHANGE SOCIAL NORMS (2017); THE DYNAMICS OF NORMS (Cristina Bicchieri et al. eds., 
1997); CRISTINA BICCHIERI, THE GRAMMAR OF SOCIETY: THE NATURE AND DYNAMICS OF 
SOCIAL NORMS (2006) (hereafter BICCHIERI, THE GRAMMAR OF SOCIETY); DONALD BLACK, THE 
BEHAVIOR OF LAW (Special ed. 2010); HUGO MERCIER & DAN SPERBER, THE ENIGMA OF 
REASON (2017); DARCIA NARVAEZ, NEUROBIOLOGY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN 
MORALITY (2014); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (Rev. ed. 1971); 
ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR 
COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990); ROBERT SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (Rev. ed. 1981); 
MICHAEL TOMASELLO, A NATURAL HISTORY OF HUMAN MORALITY (2016) (hereafter 
TOMASELLO, HUMAN MORALITY); EDNA ULLMANN-MARGALIT, THE EMERGENCE OF NORMS 
(2015). 
 73. TOMASELLO, HUMAN MORALITY, supra note 72, at 2-3 (“We proceed from the 
assumption that human morality is a form of cooperation, specifically, the form that has 
emerged as humans have adapted to new and species-unique forms of social interaction and 
organization. Because Homo sapiens is an ultracooperative primate, and presumably the only 
moral one, we further assume that human morality comprises the key set of species-unique 
proximate mechanisms—psychological processes of cognition, social interaction, and self-
regulation—that enable human individuals to survive and thrive in their especially 
cooperative social arrangements.”). 
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concept that is essential to group cohesion.74 Once combined, the success of 
those precepts ultimately gave birth to awareness of the desirability of group 
identity based on a shared morality.75 The second stage stemmed from the 
need for specialization as communities grew larger. Subgroups became 
responsible for different tasks for community survival. To maintain 
cohesiveness, the overall community developed social norms to which each 
individual and subgroup was required to adhere even when doing so ran 
contrary to his or their personal interests. Community norms required 
sacrificing personal gain for the betterment of all. The community punished 
its members when they deviated from a norm in order to give it teeth for 
the purpose of encouraging compliance and to avoid creating in compliant 
members the belief that they were fools for foregoing individual 
advancement for communal benefit. 
Aside from serving as commitment to overall welfare, compliance with 
social norms performed as an important signaling function.76 It constituted 
a public declaration that a particular subgroup’s members deemed the 
community’s norms legitimate, while also manifesting each individual’s 
commitment to the community’s survival.77 Small bands and their members 
                                                                                                                                      
 74. That sense of “We” can survive even if the group’s members know little about each 
other except for the fact that they belong to the same group, a phenomenon known as the 
“minimal group effect.” SAM GLASER, SUSPECT RACE: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF RACIAL 
PROFILING 54 (2015). 
 75. TOMASELLO, HUMAN MORALITY, supra note 72, at 5 (“Conventional cultural practices 
had role ideals that were fully ‘objective’ in the sense that everyone knew in cultural common 
ground how anyone who would be one of ‘us’ had to play those roles for collective success. 
They represented the right and wrong ways to do things.”). 
 76. Of course, not every conforming behavior signals commitment to the community’s 
needs. See POSNER, supra note 72, at 25-26 (“It should be clear that there are actually two 
ways in which signaling results in social norms. First, people engage in costly actions, like 
gift-giving, consumption of expensive goods, and shunning of people with certain 
characteristics, to signal that they value future payoffs more than bad types do. Second, 
people engage even in cheap actions, like combing their hair in one way rather than another, 
because their deviation from the norm will be punished by others who seek to signal their 
types by taking the costly action of shunning people who act in an unusual way. What we call 
a social norm, when, for example, we advise well-meaning strangers about how to behave in 
our communities, is simply a description of the behavior that emerges in these signaling 
equilibriums. In this model the social norm has no independent power, it is not an 
exogenous force, it is not internalized; it is a term for behavioral regularities that emerge as 
people interact with each other in pursuit of their everyday interests.”) (footnote omitted). 
 77. TOMASELLO, HUMAN MORALITY, supra note 72, at 5 (“Moral norms were considered 
legitimate because the individual, first, identified with the culture and so assumed a kind of 
coauthorship of them and, second, felt that her equally deserving cultural counterparts 
deserved her cooperation. Members of cultural groups thus felt an obligation to both follow 
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displayed their allegiance to the larger community by adhering to 
collectively generated objective cultural values.78 By internalizing social 
norms, individuals conformed their behavior to accepted group standards 
of right and wrong, which promoted “homogeneity of behavior” and 
communicated a strong sense of solidarity to insiders and outsiders.79  
The result was the creation of objective cultural norms that served several 
different community survival goals: They provided a standard of right and 
wrong conduct useful for measuring group allegiance; they created the 
opportunity for compliance to signal approval of and allegiance to 
communal norms; and they defined and telegraphed to neighbors a separate 
community to which no one could join without agreeing to sacrifice 
individual interests to the greater good.80 At bottom, social norms and the 
governing institutions enforcing them provided the glue that held successful 
communities together.81 In a competitive struggle for resources, 
communities that were able to foster cooperation among their constituents 
were able to outcompete rival groups that were unable to generate 
comparable group commitment.82 Compliance with norms enabled each 
community to undertake survival functions efficiently while also presenting 
itself as a formidable adversary to neighboring bands that might potentially 
compete for resources. 
                                                                                                                                      
and enforce social norms as part of their moral identity: to remain one who one was in the 
eye of the moral community, and so in one’s own eyes as well, one who was obliged to 
identify the right and wrong way of doing things[.] . . . One could deviate from these norms 
and still maintain one’s moral identify only by justifying the deviation to others, and so to 
oneself, in terms of the shared values of the moral community[.]”); see also POSNER, supra 
note 72, at 21 (“[S]ignaling is an important way not only of entering relationships, but also of 
maintaining them. . . . A large amount of social, family, political, and business behavior can 
be understood in terms of signals.”). 
 78. TOMASELLO, HUMAN MORALITY, supra note 72, at 5 (“And so was born a normatively 
constituted social order in which cooperatively rational agents focused not just on how 
individuals do act, or on how I want them to act, but, rather, on how they ought to act if they 
are to be one of ‘us.’”) (emphasis added). 
 79. Id. at 12; see also POSNER, supra note 71, at 24 (“[S]ocial norms are always about 
observed behavior . . . .”). 
 80. TOMASELLO, HUMAN MORALITY, supra note 72, at 5 (“[In Stage Two], the normative 
standards were fully ‘objective,’ the collective commitments were by and for all in the group, 
and the sense of obligation was group-mindedly rational in that it flowed from one’s moral 
identify and the felt need to justify one’s moral decisions to the moral community including 
oneself. In the end, the result of all these new ways of relating to one another in collectively 
structured cultural contexts added up for modern humans to be a kind of cultural and group 
minded ‘objective’ morality.”). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 12. 
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Ancient social norms critical to community survival have endured to the 
present.83 Norms have become the “grammar,” 84 the “cement,”85 or the 
“traffic rules”86 of society. Even today a norm is “a prescription about how 
to behave in a specific situation.”87 Norms refer to “behavior, to actions over 
which people have control, and are supported by shared expectations about 
what should/should not be done in different types of social situations.”88 A 
norm can be “formal or informal, personal or collective, descriptive of what 
most people do, or prescriptive of behavior.”89 Norms provide “scripts” for 
us to follow in making unconscious, automatic choices.90 Because social 
norms define collective obligations, they can require us to act contrary to 
                                                                                                                                      
 83. Id. at 6-7 (“One outcome of this two-step evolutionary process beyond great apes—
first to collaboration and then to culture—is that contemporary human beings are under the 
sway of at least three distinct moralities. The first is simply the cooperative proclivities of 
great apes in general, organized around a special sympathy for kin and friends: the first 
person I save from a burning shelter is my child or spouse, no deliberation needed. The 
second is a joint morality of collaboration in which I have specific responsibilities to specific 
individuals in the specific circumstances: the next person I save is the firefighting partner 
with whom I am currently collaborating (and with whom I have a joint commitment) to 
extinguish the fire. The third is a more impersonal collective morality of cultural norms and 
institutions in which all members of the cultural group are equally valuable: I save from the 
calamity all other groupmates equally and impartially (or perhaps all other persons, if my 
moral community is humanity in general), with perhaps special attention to the most 
vulnerable among us (e.g., children).”).  
 84. “Norms are the language a society speaks, the embodiment of its values and 
collective desires, the secure guide in the uncertain lands we all traverse, the common 
practices that hold human groups together.” BICCHIERI, THE GRAMMAR OF SOCIETY, supra 
note 72, at ix. 
 85. JON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY: A STUDY OF SOCIAL ORDER (1989). 
 86. Id. at 101. 
 87. CRISTINA BICCHIERI, THE GRAMMAR OF SOCIETY, supra note 72, at 94. 
 88. Id. at 10. 
 89. Id. at 1. 
 90. A “script” is a “stylized, stereotypical sequence of actions that are appropriate in [a 
particular] context” and “‘defin[e] actors and roles.’” Id. at 94. “Social norms are embedded 
into scripts.” Id. (emphasis omitted). “[W]e reason in modular ways: Most reasoning does 
not involve the application of general-purpose reasoning skills. Rather, our reasoning is tied 
to specific schemata or scripts related to particular bodies of knowledge . . . . Once a problem 
is understood in terms of a familiar schema, reasoning is correctly applied. Logicians and 
moral philosophers handle abstract concepts professionally, but the vast majority of people 
need the familiarity of well-known schemata to seamlessly perform logical operations and 
successfully employ moral reasoning.” Id. at 95. That is, a norm calls for Response X in 
Situation Y. A script explains how Response X plays out. Id. at 96. 
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our self-interest.91 They are not “written and codified; you cannot find them 
in books or be explicitly told about them at the outset of your immersion in 
a foreign culture.”92 Sometimes, we learn when others teach us; occasionally, 
observation alone is sufficient; in some cases, we learn through trial and 
error.93 We comply with “social norms,” the rules of the road for 
cooperative social behavior, for several reasons,94 such as the desire to avoid 
suffering an externally imposed sanction for noncompliance or in reliance 
on a decision-making heuristic operating consciously (or unconsciously) 
whenever we face a normative choice.95 Communal norms even influence 
                                                                                                                                      
 91. CRISTINA BICCHIERI, THE GRAMMAR OF SOCIETY, supra note 72, at 34, 38, 42 (“Social 
norms prescribe or proscribe behavior; they entail obligations and are supported by 
normative expectations. Not only do we expect others to conform to a social norm; we are 
also aware that we are expected to conform, and both these expectations are necessary 
reasons to comply with the norm.”). 
 92. Id. at ix (emphasis omitted). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 176-77 (“[N]orm formation is a step-by-step process. In a newly formed 
group, all members will anchor the current situation to what they perceive are previously 
experienced situations. Each group member will have a sense of what behavioral scripts are 
appropriate to the new situation because they resemble behaviors adopted in similar social 
contexts. As they interact, group members trade scripts, and, through discussion, they come 
to form a shared perspective what the ‘appropriate behavior’ is. Once a new, local script has 
been adopted people will interact according to the script and will even tend to apply the 
same script to new situations in which they are matched with different group members. 
When a script is agreed upon, a local norm is formed, and usually attempts to alter the 
behavior it controls will be met by sanctions . . . . [S]ince we are not a tabula rasa, every new 
group norm will be the result of a process of importing and reshaping old scripts to new 
situations. We look for analogies with past experiences to guide us, and the final outcome of 
this collective search will be something new that we can still recognize as familiar.”).  
 95. Id. at 3-4. Heuristic decision-making involves the automatic recall of the same or 
similar situations and an analysis of the plusses and minuses of following alternative paths, 
all of which is done in milliseconds. Norms provide a default or starting point for that 
analysis. Heuristic decision-making differs from the classic Chicago School cost-benefit 
analysis, which is done consciously. Id. at 4-6, 68-69 (“[T]he deliberational route to behavior 
is hardly the most common modus operandi, and social norms are habitually followed in an 
automatic way. We leave a tip in a foreign country although we know that service is 
included, trust strangers, exact revenge, donate to charities, reprimand transgressors even 
when we are not directly harmed, and show favoritism toward groups to which we belong 
without much thought to the reasons for, or the consequences of, what we are doing. More 
often than not, we behave in the ‘right’ way in that we follow the rules of our group, 
subculture or society. In so doing we coordinate with others, fulfill their normative 
expectations, and collectively behave in ways that validate our material expectations.”); Cass 
R. Sunstein, On the Divergent American Reactions to Terrorism and Climate Change, 107 
COLUM. L. REV. 503, 522 (2007) (“[P]eople have rapid, immediate reactions to persons, 
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how we perceive the reality that gives rise to such choices, because people 
are far more willing to accept facts that support their social 
predispositions.96 
The evolutionary development of social norms serves a didactic function, 
Doris would have thought, because social norms are the background against 
which the law is imposed.97 Anglo-American criminal law originated out of 
the customs of pre-Norman England.98 “Early English ‘law’ reflected the 
Anglo-Saxon-Jute-Dane customs of the local community and was 
rudimentary at best, both ‘rough and crude.’”99 The first “laws” were not 
even “laws” as we know them today. They consisted of either the local 
customs, “the folk-right,” of each separate English community, or decrees, 
known as “dooms,” which were essentially a tariff of payments due to the 
victim or his kin to forestall violent retaliation for injuries such as murder, 
mayhem, or cattle theft.100 Everyone knew the conduct forbidden by local 
norms. William I left those customs in place after becoming king. To 
centralize his control over England’s diverse local communities, he 
established a system of justice. The crown’s judges initiated the process of 
“riding circuit” to adjudicate disputes across the kingdom. To develop rules 
of decision, royal magistrates developed “the common law”—viz., the 
“customary practice,” the “common conviction of the community,” or the 
                                                                                                                                      
activities, and processes, and the immediate reaction operates as a mental shortcut for a 
more deliberative or analytic assessment of the underlying issues.”). 
 96. See Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24 YALE 
L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 151 (2006) (“[C]ultural commitments operate as a kind of heuristic in 
the rational processing of information on public policy matters. Again, citizens aren't in a 
position to figure out through personal investigation whether the death penalty deters, gun 
control undermines public safety, commerce threatens the environment, et cetera. They have 
to take the word of those whom they trust on issues of what sorts of empirical claims, and 
what sorts of data supporting such claims, are credible. The people they trust, naturally, are 
the ones who share their values—and who as a result of this same dynamic and others are 
predisposed to a particular view. As a result, even citizens who earnestly consider empirical 
policy issues in an open-minded and wholly instrumental way will align themselves into 
warring cultural factions.”). 
 97. See POSNER, supra note 71, at 4. 
 98. See, e.g., J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 1-3, 8-9 (4th ed. 
2007); CHRISTOPHER BROOKE, FROM ALFRED TO HENRY III 45 (1961); FREDERICK WILLIAM 
MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 1-4 (2008); FREDERICK WILLIAM 
MAITLAND & FRANCIS C. MONTAGUE, A SKETCH OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 6, 19, 193-99 
(1915); FREDERICK POLLOCK, THE EXPANSION OF THE COMMON LAW 148-53 (1904); see 
generally Larkin, Lost Due Process Doctrines, supra note 28, at 327-31. 
 99. Larkin, Lost Due Process Doctrines, supra note 28, at 327. 
 100. Id. at 327, 329. 
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“general custom of England.”101 The common law carried forward the 
offenses likely to disturb ‘the king’s peace’” and added to that list conduct 
that the church deemed immoral.102 Over time, scholars such as Ranulf de 
Glanville, Henry de Bracton, Thomas de Littleton, Edward Coke, and 
William Blackstone compiled the common law into treatises, and 
parliament took over the business of defining crimes.103  
The result was that the English criminal law came to consist of 
dangerous, injurious, or appropriative conduct, as well as immoral 
behavior, crimes against man and God. The early common law, therefore, 
aligned perfectly with the need to keep the king’s peace and to abide by 
God’s rules.104 Anyone who knew the Decalogue would have been familiar 
with English criminal law. The colonists brought that law with them to 
America.105 Even today the average person acquires a basic understanding 
of the law by learning the mores and customs—the norms—of the 
community from family, friends, teachers, clergy, and respected elders.  
But there is a limit to a person’s ability to acquire the necessary legal 
knowledge by observing and incorporating norms and social customs into 
their knowledge base. Scholars in anthropological, behavioral, and cognitive 
psychology have explained that people acquire knowledge of customs 
through interaction in various social settings as they observe the behavior of 
others, experiment with their own responses, and receive feedback whether 
their actions conform to accepted social norms.106 Norms of course differ 
from legal rules. The former are informal; not always enforced; and, when 
they are enforced, the state plays no role. The latter are formal, are regularly 
enforced (within resource constraints), and are always enforced only by the 
state. Knowledge of customs therefore does not always translate into an 
                                                                                                                                      
 101. BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *67; Larkin, Lost Due Process Doctrines, supra note 28, 
at 330-31. 
 102. See Sayre, supra note 3, at 68-69 (“The original objective of the criminal law was to 
keep the peace; and under the strong church influence of the Middle Ages its function was 
extended to curb moral delinquencies of one kind or another.”). 
 103. MAITLAND & MONTAGUE, supra note 98, at 2; Larkin, Lost Due Process Doctrines, 
supra note 28, at 332. 
 104. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 125 (1881) (“[T]he fact that 
crimes are also generally sins is one of the practical justifications for requiring a man to 
know the criminal law.”); Sayre, supra note 3, at 68-69; supra note 44. 
 105. See, e.g., Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 530 (1884) (noting that the Colonists 
“inherited the traditions of the English law and history”); BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL 
ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 30-31 (1990); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF 
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 299-300 (1998); Larkin, Lost Due Process Doctrines, 
supra note 28, at 339-40. 
 106. See supra note 74.  
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understanding of the law, especially when the latter is divorced from moral 
considerations. A second difficulty is that the criminal law defines 
prohibited conduct, which, by definition, are those actions that others 
should not commit, making it more difficult to learn forbidden conduct 
through observation.107 “As anyone who has lived in a foreign country 
knows, learning proscriptive norms can be difficult and the learning process 
slow and fraught with misunderstandings and false steps.”108 The third 
difficulty deals with the different size of the relevant reference group. As the 
size of that group increases so too does the difficulty of accurately divining a 
group norm.109 A fourth problem is that, as the difficulty increases of 
knowing the existence of a specific criminal law or how it applies in a 
particular setting, fewer and fewer members of the same cohort will be 
aware of what should be done to avoid it. The upshot is that there is no 
guarantee that individuals can learn the criminal law from observing 
behavior on a type of “on-the-job” training basis. 
Communities enforce social norms through informal methods such as 
criticism, ostracism, shunning, or expulsion. The criminal law takes those 
sanctions as givens and adds formal, government-imposed penalties that 
take the form of fines, incarceration, post-release work disabilities, and, in 
extreme cases, capital punishment. Yet, the criminal law recognizes that 
there are limits on the ability of public obloquy and exogenous punishment 
to force compliance with social norms and legal rules. Jean Valjean was not 
the first person to steal food rather than starve, and he surely will not be the 
last. The defenses of necessity and duress exist because there are 
circumstances in which no one can reasonably be expected to avoid 
committing a crime.110 Each one recognizes that there can be force of 
                                                                                                                                      
 107. See, e.g., BICCHIERI, THE GRAMMAR OF SOCIETY, supra note 72, at 8 (“A norm cannot 
be simply identified with a recurrent, collective, behavioral pattern. For one, norms can be 
either prescriptive or proscriptive. In the latter case, we usually do not observe the proscribed 
behavior . . . . In most cases in which a proscriptive norm is in place, we do not observe the 
behavior proscribed by the norm, and it is impossible to determine whether the absence of 
certain behaviors is due to a proscription or to something else, unless we access people’s 
beliefs and expectations.”). 
 108. Id. at 1, 8 (“Often the legal system helps, in that many proscriptive norms are made 
explicit and supported by laws, but a host of socially relevant proscriptions such as ‘do not 
stare at someone you pass by’ or ‘do not touch people you are not intimate with when you 
talk to them’ are not codified and can only be learned by trial and error.”). 
 109. See Cristina Bicchieri, Learning to Cooperate, in BICCHIERI, THE DYNAMICS OF 
NORMS, supra note 72, at 18. 
 110. See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 409-10 (1980) (“Common law historically 
distinguished between the defenses of duress and necessity. Duress was said to excuse 
criminal conduct where the actor was under an unlawful threat of imminent death or serious 
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natural (necessity) or human (duress) compulsion that no reasonable 
person can resist. They are “a tacit admission of man’s impotence against 
some of the greatest evils that assail him, as well as a measure of his moral 
obligation even in extremis.”111 A person cannot murder someone else to 
avoid his own death,112 yet the same person can leave a burning jail without 
committing the crime of escape.113 The existence of those defenses is a 
candid admission that neither informal social norms nor formal legal rules, 
nor the punishments that the community and government can impose for 
their violation, can always guarantee cooperation, compliance, and self-
sacrifice in the face of an immediate, unavoidable severe harm.  
That concession to human reality is instructive in this context. It would 
seem to follow that, if the law acknowledges limits to human willpower, the 
law should also be willing to recognize limits to human candlepower. After 
all, the latter is as much a feature of the make-up of people as the former. 
Moreover, the criminal law primarily serves to affect the behavior of actual 
                                                                                                                                      
bodily injury, which threat caused the actor to engage in conduct violating the literal terms 
of the criminal law. While the defense of duress covered the situation where the coercion had 
its source in the actions of other human beings, the defense of necessity, or choice of evils, 
traditionally covered the situation where physical forces beyond the actor's control rendered 
illegal conduct the lesser of two evils. Thus, where A destroyed a dike because B threatened 
to kill him if he did not, A would argue that he acted under duress, whereas if A destroyed 
the dike in order to protect more valuable property from flooding, A could claim a defense of 
necessity . . . . Modern cases have tended to blur the distinction between duress and 
necessity. In the court below, the majority discarded the labels ‘duress’ and ‘necessity,’ 
choosing instead to examine the policies underlying the traditional defenses. . . . In 
particular, the majority felt that the defenses were designed to spare a person from 
punishment if he acted ‘under threats or conditions that a person of ordinary firmness would 
have been unable to resist,’ or if he reasonably believed that criminal action ‘was necessary to 
avoid a harm more serious than that sought to be prevented by the statute defining the 
offense . . . . The Model Penal Code redefines the defenses along similar lines.”) (citations 
omitted); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 (A.O.D. 1962) (definition of duress), § 3.02 (same, 
“Choice of Evils”); LAFAVE, supra note 44, at 552-64 (definition of necessity). 
 111. HALL, supra note 3, at 416. 
 112. See Regina v. Dudley & Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884). 
 113. See United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482, 487 (1868) (“[C]ommon sense accepts the 
ruling . . . that the statute of 1st Edward II, which enacts that a prisoner who breaks prison 
shall be guilty of felony, does not extend to a prisoner who breaks out when the prison is on 
fire—‘for he is not to be hanged because he would not stay to be burnt.’”); see also Tomoya 
Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717, 736 (1952) (“An American with a dual nationality 
who is charged with playing the role of the traitor may defend by showing that force or 
coercion compelled such conduct.”). 
362 LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:335 
 
or potential lawbreakers and the attitude toward lawbreaking.114 It is not 
primarily a means of educating the public about a particular subject matter, 
particularly one that is scientific or technical. 
Start with a simple but undeniably true proposition: no one does or 
could know everything. Science offers a paradigmatic example. As Yale Law 
School Professor Dan Kahan has noted, “The public is only modestly 
science literate.”115 “Figuring out the empirical consequences of criminal, 
environmental, and other regulatory laws is extremely complicated. 
Scientists often disagree about such matters.”116 Even a scientific consensus 
“is based on highly technical forms of proof that most members of the 
public can't realistically be expected to understand, much less verify for 
themselves.”117 The difficulty is enhanced when you remember that experts 
can, and often do, disagree and that the average person resolves such 
disagreements by falling back on what he is culturally conditioned to accept 
as true.118  
Consider the example that Professor Kahan uses to illustrate his point: 
medicine.119 Suppose A, a construction worker, is suffering from weakness, 
shortness of breath, and widespread bruising, and is in such distress that he 
visits his physician. The physician, suspecting that A may be suffering from 
cancer, refers A to an oncologist at the Johns Hopkins Medical School, who 
diagnoses A as suffering from leukemia and recommends that A undergo 
radiation, chemotherapy, and a bone marrow transplant to reduce and 
hopefully eliminate A’s cancer. A seeks a second opinion from the Mayo 
Clinic, and the oncologist there fully agrees with the one at Johns Hopkins. 
What is A now likely to do? A could read whatever he can find on the 
Internet to learn about his disease and the recommended treatments, but 
that does not guarantee that he will learn what he needs to know. A could 
then decide to apply to medical school, wait a year to learn if he has been 
accepted, spend four years in school, four more years in a residency 
program for internists, and then two additional years in an oncology 
fellowship in order to know as much as his oncologists already know. A is 
unlikely to choose that course because he would likely be dead before he 
                                                                                                                                      
 114. See POSNER, supra note 71, at 33 (“When a law changes an equilibrium, it has two 
separate effects. The first effect is behavioral: the law affects the actions people take . . . . The 
second effect is hermeneutic: The law changes beliefs that people have.”). 
 115. DAN M. KAHAN, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE SCIENCE OF SCIENCE 
COMMUNICATION 38 (2017). 
 116. Kahan & Braman, supra note 96, at 149. 
 117. Id. at 149. 
 118. Id. at 167. 
 119. KAHAN, supra note 115, at 7. 
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completed that 11-year period. Knowing that, A is likely to trust the 
oncologists’ recommendations. As one scholar has noted, relying on the 
expertise of others is a “division of cognitive labour that is intrinsic to all 
cultures.”120 
Ironically, that division of labor makes it extraordinarily difficult for the 
ordinary person to acquire the criminal law knowledge that today’s codes 
assume he has. Beginning in the second half of the nineteenth century, 
industrialization and urbanization lead assemblies to draft the criminal 
code into service as a means of governing a new society. Gone was the 
agriculturally based economy known to the Framers. In its place was the 
industrial economy of railroads, steamships, and the telegraph. The 
dominant philosophy was Progressivism, which endorsed two fundamental 
tenets: First, properly educated, trained, and experienced specialists can find 
the necessary scientific or technical solutions for each of society’s problems. 
Second, for those experts to do their job, the law should leave them free 
from governance by politics, which means from control by the public and 
their elected officials. The result was the creation of the Administrative State 
and governance by technocrats.121  
Yet, there is a necessary consequence of a commitment to the necessity of 
governance by experts that the criminal law has yet to acknowledge, let 
alone accept, in full. If we leave regulation to specialists because only they 
can satisfactorily understand how to deal with difficult problems, then it 
follows that we cannot expect ordinary people to understand the complex 
solutions that experts devise. Social norms can teach us the basic principles 
required to generate the trust necessary for coordinated behavior to 
originate and endure. People learn and understand the simple norms that 
decry murdering, raping, robbing, or swindling our neighbors. But it does 
not follow that ordinary people are also capable of comprehending a highly 
technical subject matter. People can be expected to recognize that dumping 
a well-known poison such as arsenic into a municipal water supply is no 
less an assault than hitting someone with a two-by-four. The ordinary 
person, however, will not be able to extrapolate from elementary social go-
bys what the answer is to a highly complicated subject matter. The 
difference between “recycled material” and “waste” is one such problem 
that is far too difficult for “a person of ordinary intelligence” to be able to 
negotiate. The average person lacks the education necessary to understand 
                                                                                                                                      
 120. Frank C. Keil, Folkscience: Coarse Interpretations of a Complex Reality, 7 TRENDS IN 
COGNITIVE SCIENCES 8, 368, 372 (2003). 
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that difference.122 Law school graduates—people in that twelve percent of 
the population with advanced degrees of some kind—would have difficulty 
drawing that distinction. In fact, few lawyers would be able to define it 
because the distinction is not a feature of the law of contracts, torts, civil 
procedure, or any other subject that is a required course in every law school. 
The distinction is drawn by regulations that only attorneys practicing 
environmental law have occasion to use. Even then perhaps only lawyers 
working in the subspecialty dealing with the proper storage and disposal of 
hazardous waste truly know what those concepts mean. 
The problem is not with the delegation of regulatory authority to 
unelected administrative officials as a means of governing the industrial 
process. Legislatures need to rely on the expertise of nonpolitical experts in 
the executive branch for the technical know-how that governance demands. 
Congress may know that a problem exists (for example, the disposal of 
hazardous waste near a water supply) but recognize that it can only draft a 
broadly defined term (for example, “solid waste”) in a statute (for example, 
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act) because it lacks the scientific 
knowledge to completely define that term. The sensible option would be to 
authorize an expert agency (for example, the EPA) to promulgate rules 
specifying the meaning of a term (for example, “hazardous waste”) by 
identifying specific examples of a term’s meaning (for example, “listed 
hazardous wastes”) or particular exemptions from its reach (for example, 
“recyclable materials”).123 The most sensible regulatory approach to protect 
public health dictates that Congress grant agencies both the authority to list 
specific hazards and the flexibility to revise that list over time as science 
identifies new dangers. 
The problem is also not with society’s decision to use law to provide a 
remedy for violations of governing statutes and rules. The law is a critical 
tool for governance of an industrial society and for remedying the harms 
that occur when a private or public train runs off the tracks. Tort law serves 
as a mechanism for allocating responsibility for industrial injuries. The law 
of equity defines the circumstances in which the government or an injured 
private party can enjoin future violations of statutes and rules. Both options 
are sensible ones for any society that wishes to force wrongdoers to 
internalize their costs, in the words of an economist, or to provide justice to 
parties injured by an errant train.  
                                                                                                                                      
 122. For a discussion of the difficulty that inquiry poses, see Vidrine v. United States, 846 
F. Supp. 2d 550, 561-69 (W.D. La. 2011). 
 123. See Larkin, Strict Liability, supra note 58, at 1088-89 (citing the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (codified at 42 
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2018] THE FOLLY OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 365 
 
The problem is that it may be infeasible to use the criminal law as the 
enforcement mechanism. The reason is that the esoteric nature of the 
subject matter is beyond the ken of the ordinary person. We do not, and 
could not, demand that the average person know—that is, acquire and 
remember the scientific knowledge necessary to make the relevant 
decisions—the research-based science underlying the judgments critical to 
determine whether a particular substance is a hazardous waste. Only people 
with advanced education possess the know-how critical to making those 
decisions, education that, as explained above, the average person does not 
possess.124 If we create administrative agencies and staff them with subject 
matter experts—physicians, biochemists, geologists, hydrologists, and so 
forth—because they are the only people knowledgeable enough to 
understand and solve a scientific problem, we must accept that a 
consequence of our decision is the recognition that ordinary individuals will 
not know what specialists know. That recognition should have a powerful 
effect on our willingness to use the criminal law to enforce what only a 
small percentage of the public can know. We do not convict and punish 
people for not understanding organic chemistry, at least not if we want 
ninety-nine percent of the population to remain outside prison. 
 Congress acts properly by enlisting help from experts staffing 
administrative agencies. It can best do its job of governing the nation by 
acting at a macro level—that is, by creating specialized agencies and 
empowering their experts to regulate at a micro level. By legislating in that 
fashion, Congress can also grant the executive branch considerable 
regulatory flexibility. An agency can revise existing rules or promulgate new 
ones whenever necessary to address worsening or newly emerging hazards 
without having to return to Congress for supplemental regulatory 
authorization. That practice also enables the agency to invoke its superior 
technical and scientific expertise regarding a particular substance, 
production process, or medical condition whenever a new problem arises or 
an old one becomes aggravated. Broadly written regulatory statutes granting 
administrative agencies room to act and react are valuable because they 
enable agencies to respond quickly by revising their rules and policies more 
quickly than Congress can (ordinarily) legislate. To be sure, some members 
of Congress are experts in a particular field; more than a dozen are 
physicians.125 But, for the most part, they are generalists and lack the 
                                                                                                                                      
 124. See supra text accompanying notes 38-40. 
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knowledge necessary, for example, to decide what substances are hazardous. 
Scientists are better qualified for that task. If that is true, if members of 
Congress cannot make expert-level decisions, why should we expect that 
ordinary people can make them? 
The specialization and division of labor that was a consequence of the 
law’s response to industrialization and urbanization has not disappeared 
over time. On the contrary, it is more prevalent today than in earlier times. 
Consider, again, medicine. The European Union recognizes more than fifty 
specialties;126 the United States has more than twice that number.127 In fact, 
experts create subspecialties within their profession as they enhance their 
knowledge of a particular discipline and, as the joke goes, learn more and 
more about less and less. That development increases the likelihood for a 
successful resolution of a problem, but also makes it even less likely that an 
ordinary person will be able to know and understand what to do and what 
decisions to make. The average person knows that he lacks not only the 
generalized scientific knowledge necessary to answer a question, but also 
the know-how that experts acquire in their far more discrete subspecialties. 
Ordinary people recognize the value of that specialization. They see a 
cardiologist if their problem is heart disease, not cancer; a pulmonologist 
for breathing difficulties, not a psychiatrist: and an orthopedic surgeon for a 
torn ACL, not an obstetrician. In each case, an ordinary person realizes that 
he lacks the knowledge that a general practitioner possesses, let alone what a 
board-certified specialist knows. 
Change the scenario, have the government charge A with a felony, and 
you are likely to see a parallel process: A is likely to seek advice from a 
criminal defense attorney, not a lawyer who drafts wills, gives tax advice, or 
handles mergers and acquisitions. A is also likely to rely on his attorney’s 
recommendations regarding how to plead and what to do to defend himself 
against the charge. Part of the reason is that the ordinary person is not 
familiar with the options available to him. Recognition that a layman is not 
qualified to defend himself against a professional prosecutor was the 
principal reason why the Supreme Court of the United States concluded 
that the Sixth Amendment Counsel Clause grants an indigent defendant the 
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right to be represented by a lawyer at trial.128 There should be no doubt that 
the average layman does not know the law to the extent that an attorney 
does. 
Society certainly does not expect that the ordinary person can acquire the 
legal knowledge necessary to practice law simply by being observant or 
researching the Internet. To practice law, one must pass the state bar 
examination, and to sit for the exam, one must graduate from an accredited 
law school or complete a multi-year apprenticeship in states that still allow 
someone to “read the law.” Like every other type of professional school, law 
schools do not assume that you know the subject matter before arriving; 
they teach every student what every lawyer needs to know. Criminal law is a 
basic course, often taken during the first year. A law student learns the basic 
principles of the criminal law, and later relearns them when studying for the 
bar exam. Attorneys who practice in that field—prosecutors, public 
defenders, and private criminal defense attorneys—learn far more about the 
criminal law in their jurisdiction through working with clients, opponents, 
judges, and the various personnel employed by the criminal justice system 
(such as police officers, federal agents, probation and parole officers, and so 
forth) than they learned in class in law school.  
The growth in the number and size of today’s criminal codes, as well as 
in the complexity of some offenses, makes relevant the issue whether 
complete knowledge of the criminal law is humanly possible. For a “person 
of ordinary intelligence,” the answer is, “No.” Professor Glenn Harlan 
Reynolds make that point quite well: “[A]ny reasonable observer would 
have to conclude that actual knowledge of all applicable criminal laws and 
regulations is impossible, especially when those regulations frequently 
depart from any intuitive sense of what ‘ought’ to be legal or illegal.”129 It is 
                                                                                                                                      
 128. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963) (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 
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doubtful that the law can place that burden on the average person. In fact, 
the task involved in acquiring that knowledge on a continuing basis would 
tax the capabilities of the average lawyer, law professor, or judge. As 
criminal law scholar Bill Stuntz once confessed, “even criminal law 
professors rarely know much about what conduct is and isn’t criminal in 
their jurisdictions.”130  
Of course, legislators do not always (rarely?) pass new criminal laws after 
serious reflection and debate over the need for a new rule and the wisdom 
of enlisting the criminal justice system as the mechanism for enforcing it. 
Elected officials generally respond to the demands of interested parties. 
Those parties want the society to formally declare that the subject of interest 
to them—for example, the environment—is also entitled to the protection 
of the criminal law—for example, the protection afforded to bodily 
integrity. Politicians, therefore, trade laws for votes. The former receive 
support at the polls; the latter, status. Now, they can claim, there is no 
difference between the importance of copyright theft and automobile theft. 
Both are investigated and prosecuted by the state, and both can land 
someone in jail for crossing the line. Forgotten or ignored in that process is 
any consideration of the average person’s ability to find that line when 
confronting what to do with, say, a barrel of oil that might or might not be 
able to be reused or with rags that might or might not contain a sufficient 
quantity of that oil to create a problem if they wind up in the wrong 
location131—to say nothing of whether lobsters have to be packed in plastic 
or cardboard boxes when caught.132 The criminal law should not demand 
the impossible in pursuit of some “other-worldly idealism.”133  
When challenged, legislators will say that prosecutors will exercise good 
judgment in selecting cases to prosecute. That is not a comforting 
proposition. Aside from the fact that our legal system places its trust in the 
law, not in people,134 and aside from the fact that any other system would be 
“irrational” and “immoral”,135 there is the problem that experience proves 
that prosecutors, like other government officials, at times will be far from 
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the “angels” who would not be in need of legal restraint.136 As long as we use 
the Vietnam-era “body count” method of measuring law enforcement 
success,137 we will see abuses of the charging power.138 Prosecutors will find 
some cases too tempting to pass up because they look like a few hours of 
plea bargaining and a “cheap stat.”139 
V. THE ROAD FORWARD 
Where does that leave us? If we require that criminal laws already be on 
the books, if we require that those laws be accessible, if we require that they 
also be understandable by the average person—if we do all that, it makes 
little sense to find someone guilty if no reasonable person would have 
known where the line separating illegal from legal conduct lies. As Stanford 
Professor Herb Packer explained long ago: 
If the function of the vagueness doctrine is, as is so often said in 
the cases, to give the defendant fair warning that his conduct is 
criminal, then one is led to suppose that some constitutional 
importance attaches to giving people such warning or at least 
making such warning available to them. If a man does an act 
under circumstances that make the act criminal, but he is 
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unaware of those circumstances, surely he has not had fair 
warning that his conduct is criminal. If “fair warning” is a 
constitutional requisite in terms of the language of a criminal 
statute, why is it not also a constitutional requisite so far as the 
defendant's state of mind with respect to his activities is 
concerned? Or, even more to the point, if he is unaware that his 
conduct is labeled as criminal by a statute, is he not in much the 
same position as one who is convicted under a statute which is 
too vague to give “fair warning”? In both cases, the defendant is 
by hypothesis unblameworthy in that he has acted without 
advertence or negligent inadvertence to the possibility that his 
conduct might be criminal. If warning to the prospective 
defendant is really the thrust of the vagueness doctrine, then it 
seems inescapable that disturbing questions are raised, not only 
about so-called strict liability offenses in the criminal law, but 
about the whole range of criminal liabilities that are upheld 
despite the defendant's plea of ignorance of the law.140 
No legal system worthy of being labeled as just can ignore the plight of 
parties who cross a line that neither they nor any reasonable person could 
have known. We must address that problem. Precisely how to do so is 
beyond the scope of this Article, but there are at least three available 
options. We can require the government to prove that every defendant 
knew that he broke the law,141 we can allow someone who unwittingly 
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crossed the line to raise a mistake-of-law defense,142 or we can endorse 
something else nearly as effective.143  Whatever choice we make, we need to 
make one. If we believe that our criminal justice system should never 
convict, let alone imprison, someone who was blameless because the law 
was unknowable, we must make the criminal law understandable. Until 
then, we must leave alone people who would mistakenly cross what can be 
an invisible line. 
Doris, then, would have realized that she had one more question to 
consider. Does a mistake-of-law defense ask too much of the courts? How 
can a court know or learn what knowledge the average person possesses 
about the law? The defense requires a court to know the answers to 
inquiries such as the following: Does an average person know whether 
heroin trafficking is illegal (yes); whether selling software, electronic 
listening devices, explosives, night-vision goggles, and the like to foreign 
nations—whether Russia, China, or England—requires an export license 
(probably); and whether printing for your brother an article about him 
from a website requiring a paid subscription is illegal (who knows). If 
judges cannot answer those questions in a reasonable, objective manner, 
perhaps the appropriate course is to skip the issue altogether and decline to 
recognize a mistake-of-law defense. 
Doris would have concluded, however, that there was no need to 
surrender to the fear that the courts cannot manage that inquiry. There are 
other issues comparable in their nature to what a court must decide in 
connection with a mistake-of-law defense. The most obvious one is the 
inquiry required by negligence law as to whether a person’s conduct is 
reasonable. Courts have undertaken that inquiry for more than a century 
even though it requires them to make a judgment as to what a cost-benefit 
analysis would require and what the law makes relevant.144 Moreover, there 
are occasions when a person must know what a statute, ordinance, or rule 
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demands him to do or refrain from doing in order to act in a reasonable 
manner.145 Similarly, judges must decide what society considers reasonable 
when deciding many Fourth Amendment issues.146 The Amendment 
protects against unjustified government intrusions into a “reasonable,” 
“justifiable,” or “legitimate expectation of privacy.”147 Part of the inquiry 
necessary to define that concept is to ask whether society is prepared to 
accept as reasonable an individual’s own subjective expectation of 
privacy.148 Both elements must be present; the Fourth Amendment does not 
protect an individual’s objectively unreasonable expectation of privacy.149 
There also are other instances in which a court must decide a legal issue 
under a “reasonableness” standard.150 That type of inquiry, Doris would 
have realized, is commonplace. 
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theory that one would hardly be surprised to learn that possession of hand grenades is not an 
innocent act. They are highly dangerous offensive weapons, no less dangerous than the 
narcotics involved in United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 254 [(1922)], where a defendant 
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The inquiry required by a mistake-or-law defense is not materially 
different. The court would need to decide whether a reasonable person 
would have known that the conduct charged against him was a crime. To 
answer that question, a court would compare the conduct alleged to be 
unlawful against what the law has always recognized as illegal conduct. If 
“horse stealing” is a crime, it is not much of a leap to conclude that stealing 
a motor vehicle is just another form of thievery. Moreover, the common law 
distinction between crimes that are malum in se—offenses that are 
inherently evil—and malum prohibitum—offenses deemed an offense only 
because a statute so declared—is a useful go-by when making those 
judgments.151 
There will be close cases, of course. There always are when the law 
requires a line to be drawn. But a fine line is just that: fine, not invisible. 
Judges should be confident that they will be able to identify reasonable legal 
mistakes with the same degree of objectivity and skill that they already 
display when defining the reasonableness of factual mistakes. 
                                                                                                                                      
was convicted of sale of narcotics against his claim that he did not know the drugs were 
covered by a federal act.”); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Reasonableness In and Out of Negligence 
Law, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 2131 (2015). 
 151 See Larkin, Strict Liability, supra note 58, at 1093-94 (“Indeed, it is fair to say that 
many regulatory statutes are categorically different from criminal laws. The latter 
altogether forbid identified types of actually or potentially harmful or dangerous conduct, 
while the former allow certain types of such conduct to occur in limited amounts, at 
particular times, or by certain parties. The environmental laws, for example, allow 
manufacturers to discharge certain pollutants into the air, water, or land so long as a 
responsible party has a permit for that activity and does not exceed the maximum authorized 
amount each period. By contrast, no one can obtain a permit to commit a bank robbery, and 
there is no maximum number of burglaries that a person can commit during a calendar year. 
If pollution is unavoidable and generating X amount of it can be and is expressly permitted, 
we cannot persuasively argue that pollution is as morally wrong as murder, rape, or robbery 
and that the criminal law must treat each harm as seriously as it treats these. Moreover, given 
that generating X amount of pollution is lawful, it is difficult to argue that X + Y always and 
everywhere is clearly wrongful, particularly when Y is small, when it is unduly onerous (or 
expensive) to identify precisely the exact difference between those two outputs (and their 
effect), or when it is equally difficult to know exactly when someone crosses the line between 
them. The result is that the average person would not necessarily know that the actus reus--
or ‘guilty act’--element of a regulatory offense is a crime. If you also consider that the subject 
matter being regulated is one requiring specialized scientific or technical knowledge in order 
to understand the process at issue or the difference between outputs X and X + Y, the 
likelihood could approach a certainty that eliminating a mens rea element would result in the 
conviction of a morally innocent party.”) (footnotes omitted).  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Some hoary criminal law maxims still are sensible today. The 
presumption of knowledge of the criminal law, however, is not one of them. 
No one can know everything, and the larger and more complicated a 
subject matter becomes, the smaller will be the number of people who 
understand it. No criminal justice system worthy of that name can demand 
more knowledge of the penal law than what can be expected of the average 
person. The existence of the necessity and duress defenses proves that the 
criminal law accepts the reality that average individuals will break the law 
because they lack the fearless honesty of George Washington or self-
sacrificing character of Sydney Carton. If so, the criminal law should also 
accept the reality that that the average person has less knowledge of the law 
than William Blackstone. Honesty and humility demand at least that much. 
